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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Abdul Williams appeals his conviction and sentence in a 
criminal case. He argues that the District Court erroneously 
sentenced him as a career offender under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
Williams's conviction and sentence. 
 
I. 
 
The facts in this case are relatively simple. Williams was 
arrested and indicted for distributing heroin and 
purchasing heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2. He subsequently 
entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead 
guilty to a two-count Information charging that he 
knowingly and intentionally used a telephone to commit, 
cause, and facilitate the distribution of heroin in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 843(b). Williams pleaded guilty to both 
counts. 
 
At a sentencing hearing, the government asked the 
District Court to sentence Williams as a career offender 
pursuant to S 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.").1 In making this request, the 
government asserted (1) that Williams was at least 18 years 
old when he committed the instant offense, (2) that the 
offense was a "controlled substance offense," and (3) that 
Williams had received at least two prior felony convictions 
for "controlled substance offense[s]." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Except where indicated otherwise, all references are to the Sentencing 
Guidelines in effect on July 17, 1997--the day Williams was sentenced. 
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Williams challenged only the second of these assertions, 
arguing that his conviction under S 843(b) did not qualify as 
a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of 
determining career offender status under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that 
Williams had committed a "controlled substance offense" 
and was therefore a career offender for purposes of 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. Accordingly, the District Court sentenced 
him to a 92 month term of imprisonment. 
 
Williams appealed the District Court's decision to 
sentence him as a career offender. Because this case 
requires us to resolve a question of law, our review is 
plenary. United States v. Sabarese, 71 F.3d 94, 95 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant can be 
sentenced as a career offender if 
 
       (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the 
       time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of 
       conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence 
       or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the 
       defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of 
       either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
       offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. Williams does not dispute that he was at 
least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; nor 
does he deny having received at least two prior felony 
convictions for controlled substance offenses. See Br. for 
Appellant at 11 ("[I]t is undisputed that thefirst and third 
prongs are met."). Accordingly, the only question before us 
is whether Williams's 21 U.S.C. S 843(b) conviction can be 
considered a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
 
Williams raises two arguments in support of his 
contention that it cannot. First, he argues that"the plain 
language of [U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2] and its commentary 
demonstrate that . . . a conviction [under S 843(b)] is not" 
a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of 
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determining career offender status. Br. for Appellant at 9. 
Second, he argues that the Sentencing Commission's 
definition of "controlled substance offense" is ambiguous 
and must therefore be construed in his favor. For the 
reasons discussed below, we disagree. 
 
A. The Guidelines define a "controlled substance offense" 
as "an offense under a federal or state law prohibiting the 
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing 
of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a 
controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, 
import, export, distribute, or dispense." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2) 
(emphasis added). Thus, a crime constitutes a "controlled 
substance offense" if the law creating it prohibits at least 
one of the activities enumerated in S 4B1.2(2).2 Id. 
 
Therefore, we must determine whether S 843(b) prohibits 
at least one of the activities enumerated in S 4B1.2(2). 
Section 843(b) provides that 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
       intentionally to use any communication facility in 
       committing or in causing or facilitating the commission 
       of any acts constituting a felony under any provision of 
       this [control and enforcement] subchapter or[the 
       import and export] subchapter . . . of this [drug abuse 
       and prevention] chapter. 
 
21 U.S.C. S 843(b). Many of the provisions referenced in 
S 843(b) prohibit "the manufacture, import, export, 
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or 
the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to 
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2). See e.g., 21 U.S.C. S 841(a) (prohibiting 
the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled 
substances, and possession of controlled substances with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because inchoate drug crimes are "offense[s] under a . . . law 
prohibiting the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing 
of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled 
substance 
. . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or 
dispense," 
they must be considered "controlled substance offenses." U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2 Commentary, Application Note 1 ("The term[ ] . . . `controlled 
substance offense' include[s] aiding and abetting, conspiring, and 
attempting to commit such offenses."). Id. 
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intent to distribute); 21 U.S.C. S 952 (prohibiting the 
importation of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. S 953 
(prohibiting the export of controlled substances). 
Consequently, many of the offenses that can give rise to a 
S 843(b) conviction involve "the manufacture, import, 
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance 
. . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with 
intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or 
dispense." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2). See e.g., 21 U.S.C. S 841(b) 
(prescribing penalties for the manufacture, distribution, 
and dispensing of controlled substances, and for possession 
of controlled substances with intent to distribute); 21 
U.S.C. S 960 (prescribing penalties for the unlawful import 
and export of controlled substances); see also United States 
v. Johnstone, 856 F.2d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 1988) ("The 
occurrence of [an] underlying drug felony is a fact 
necessary to finding a violation of S 843(b)."). Where such 
an offense provides the basis for a particular S 843(b) 
conviction, that conviction must be considered "an offense 
under a . . . law prohibiting the manufacture, import, 
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance 
. . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with 
intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or 
dispense." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2). 
 
Stated differently, where a particular S 843(b) conviction 
establishes that the defendant "committ[ed]," "caus[ed]," or 
"facilitat[ed]" one of the acts enumerated in S 4B1.2(2), that 
conviction qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" for 
purposes of determining career offender status. 3 The three 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We avoid concluding that all S 843(b) convictions are "controlled 
substance offense[s]" because a defendant could be convicted under 
S 843(b) without engaging in any of the activities enumerated in 
S 4B1.2(2). For example, in certain circumstances, the mere possession 
of a controlled substance can be considered a felony under 21 U.S.C. 
S 844(a). 21 U.S.C. S 844(a) ("[I]f [a person] commits [the] offense[of 
possession of a controlled substance] after a prior conviction or 
convictions under this subsection have become final, he shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years, a fine of 
not more than $10,000, or both."). Under those circumstances, a 
defendant could conceivably be convicted under S 843(b) for using a 
telephone to facilitate the mere possession of a controlled substance. 
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Courts of Appeals that have confronted this issue have 
reached similar conclusions.4 See United States v. Mueller, 
112 F.3d 277, 280-83 (7th Cir. 1997) ("By its plain terms, 
the underlying elements of 21 U.S.C. S 843(b) constitute a 
`controlled substance offense.' "); United States v. Walton, 
56 F.3d 551, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The distribution of 
cocaine is clearly a [`controlled substance offense'] . . . ."); 
United States v. Vea-Gonzalez, 999 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("[B]ecause section 843(b) effectively prohibits 
the same conduct as is prohibited by `controlled substance 
offenses,' the statute is a controlled substance offense for 
purposes of the career offender guideline."); cf. United 
States v. Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that S 843(b) is a "felony drug offense" under 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) because it "prohibits drug 
distribution"). 
 
The offense underlying Williams's S 843(b) conviction was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Such a conviction would not constitute a "controlled substance offense" 
because simple possession is not "an offense under a . . . law prohibiting 
the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . 
. 
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2). 
 
4. We are not aware of a single instance in which a court has concluded 
that a S 843(b) conviction cannot qualify as a"controlled substance 
offense" for purposes of determining career offender status. Aware of the 
dearth of case law supporting his argument, Williams cites several cases 
involving crimes that clearly do not constitute "controlled substance 
offense[s]." See United States v. Dolt, 27 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that a conviction under Florida's solicitation statute did not 
qualify as a "controlled substance offense"); United States v. Baker, 16 
F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. 
S 856 was not a "controlled substance offense" where the underlying 
offense was mere possession of a controlled substance); United States v. 
Wagner, 994 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that possession of 
a precursor chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled substance 
was not a "controlled substance offense"); United States v. Liranzo, 944 
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that a conviction under New York's 
criminal facilitation statute did not qualify as a"controlled substance 
offense"). Because these cases do not pertain toS 843(b) convictions, 
they do not advance Williams's argument. 
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the distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 841(a). 
See Plea Agreement With Abdul Williams, App. at 22 ("The 
underlying offense is the distribution of heroin."). Without 
question, the distribution of heroin in violation of S 841(a) 
is "an offense under a . . . law prohibiting the . . . 
distribution . . . of a controlled substance . . . ." U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2(2). Williams's S 843(b) conviction must therefore be 
considered a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of 
determining career offender status. 
 
B. In the alternative, Williams argues that S 4B1.2(2) is 
ambiguous, and asks us to invoke the rule of lenity to 
resolve the ambiguity in his favor. Br. for Appellant at 22- 
24; see e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 
(1971) (explaining that the rule of lenity dictates that 
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity [to the defendant]."). 
However, "because there is nothing ambiguous" about 
S 4B1.2(2), "the rule of lenity does not apply." United States 
v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the 
Sentencing Guidelines' definition of "controlled substance 
offense" was ambiguous, we would still be compelled to 
affirm. Several months after Williams was sentenced, the 
Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to 
S 4B1.2.5 As amended, the commentary resolves any 
ambiguity that may have existed when Williams was 
sentenced, explaining that 
 
       Using a communications facility in committing, 
       causing, or facilitating a drug offense (21 U.S.C. 
       S 843(b)) is a "controlled substance offense" if the 
       offense of conviction established that the underlying 
       offense (the offense committed, caused, or facilitated) 
       was a controlled substance offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 568 (effective Nov. 1, 1997) 
(currently designated as U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 Commentary, 
Application Note 1)("Amendment 568"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Williams was sentenced on July 14, 1997. The amendment became 
effective November 1, 1997. 
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It is beyond dispute that the offense underlying 
Williams's S 843(b) conviction was the distribution of heroin 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841. Without question, the 
distribution of heroin is a "controlled substance offense." 
Therefore, if we give Amendment 568 retrospective effect, 
we must affirm. 
 
Williams argues that because Amendment 568 became 
effective after he was sentenced, "it has no application to 
this appeal except to show that it was not at all clear at the 
time he was sentenced that [a S 843(b) conviction]" could be 
considered a "controlled substance offense." Br. for 
Appellant at 9, n.5. We reject this argument inasmuch as 
it ignores "the established principle that a post-sentencing 
amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments 
should be given effect if it `clarifies' the guideline or 
comment in place at the time of sentencing." United States 
v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Amendment 568 "does not overrule prior constructions of 
the Guideline." United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1405 
(3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). See section IIA, 
infra. Nor does it "effect[ ] a substantive change in the law." 
Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 490. Rather, it "confirms our 
reading of the Guideline," thereby "clarif[ying]" S 4B1.2's 
definition of "controlled substance offense." Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
at 1405. See section IIA, supra. Therefore, we can apply 
Amendment 568 retrospectively without violating the ex 
post facto clause. Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1405. 
 
Amendment 568 unquestionably resolves this dispute in 
favor of the government. Thus, even if we were to conclude 
that the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of"controlled 
substance offense" was ambiguous when Williams was 
sentenced, we would still affirm. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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